Origins 17(1):3-7 (1990).
EDITORIAL
Two centuries ago the French mathematician-astronomer Pierre Simon
de Laplace developed the nebular hypothesis which proposed that the solar system
originated by condensation from vaporous matter. Laplace, who had become famous, decided
to present a copy of one of his books to the Emperor Napoleon, who had been informed in
advance that the book contained no mention of God. The emperor asked Laplace why he had
never even mentioned the Creator of the universe in his book. Laplace replied tersely
"that he had no need of that particular hypothesis" (1).
Explanations of origins which excluded God were not new with Laplace.
They had been suggested earlier by a number of philosophers and gained further acceptance
when naturalistic scientific explanations (those which exclude the supernatural) gained
popularity.
The tendency in science towards self-sufficiency as illustrated by
Laplace's comment is important in determining the intrinsic value of scientific
conclusions. The much-respected scientific philosopher Michael Polanyi (2) makes the
following comments in addressing the origin of the problem:
This is where I see the trouble, where a deep-seated disturbance between science and all other culture appears to lie. I believe that this disturbance was inherent originally in the liberating impact of modern science on medieval thought and has only later turned pathological.
Science rebelled against authority. It rejected deduction [reasoning based on premises] from first causes in favour of empirical [sense perception] generalizations. Its ultimate ideal was a mechanistic theory of the universe . . . .
One of the important mechanistic explanations has been the theory of evolution.
In the early part of this century science was considered by many as the
authoritative source of information with almost limitless potential. These views were
strengthened by the work of the group called the Vienna Circle, which consisted of
philosophers, scientists and mathematicians who met regularly in Vienna, Austria, in the
1920s and 1930s. A related group met in Berlin. World War II brought on the demise of
these groups.
The Vienna Circle advocated logical empiricism, also referred to as
scientific empiricism. This concept affirms sense-experience as the basis for knowledge.
The Circle also emphasized positivism which in its most extreme form stipulates that the
only valid kind of knowledge is scientific. Their famous "manifesto" stated:
We are struggling for order and clarity. We reject all hazy perspectives and bottomless depths. For in science there are no depths; everything in it is on the surface (3).
Implied in this statement is the concept that metaphysics (the more
abstruse aspects of philosophy, such as ultimate beginnings, religion, ethics, and
esthetics) is unacceptable. Faith in the methodological perfection of science developed,
and attempts were made to make all meaningful concepts fit into physical coordinates such
as time and space. Physico-mathematical information was elevated to the level of absolute
truth.
Logical empiricism dominated in scientific thinking for many decades to
well past the middle of the twentieth century, even though some disturbing, challenging
developments had made their appearance earlier. In 1927 the German physicist Werner
Heisenberg enunciated the principle of uncertainty which denied the possibility of
absolute knowledge of certain physical phenomena. For example, the greater the accuracy in
measuring the position of an electron, the less accurately one is able to measure its
speed simultaneously. The principle evoked much discussion regarding the subjective nature
of what is assumed to be knowledge.
Mathematics and logic were also in trouble. In 1931 the mathematician
Kurt Gödel at the University of Vienna published a short and unwelcomed paper which
showed that any system large enough to be interesting should have some unprovable
elements. Several other scholars developed theorems along the same line. These theorems,
known as the limitative theorems, dashed any hopes of finding a logical fool-proof system
of truth. Even mathematics, which was free of the limits of observations and other
restrictions of science, was found to lack in certainty. It turns out that belief in the
consistency of mathematics is a matter of faith and not of logical proof. Likewise no
broad scientific statement can be free of uncertainties. This all ran counter to the hopes
of the Vienna Circle.
Others addressed more directly the apparent unwarranted respect for
science. One of the most vocal critics has been Theodore Roszak, who objected to the
reductionist (oversimplification) tendencies of scientific interpretations. In particular
he criticized science for oversimplifying reality and for "the turning of people and
nature into more, worthless things" (4). According to him, man is more than a mere
machine.
The noted, and sometimes controversial, philosopher of science, Paul
Feyerabend, may be science's most vocal critic (5). He considers science to be an
anarchist movement. He points out that since there is no one scientific method, hence no
consistency in science, the success of science must depend not only on logic but on
persuasion, propaganda, subterfuge, and rhetoric. Due to its subjectivity, he states,
science should be given equal status with astrology and witchcraft. Bemoaning the
authority and respect generally given to science and scientists he states, "... the
most stupid procedures and the most laughable results in their domain are surrounded with
an aura of excellence. It is time to cut them down in size, and to give them a more modest
position in society" (6).
All of this and much more contributed to the demise of logical
empiricism. The eminent scientific philosopher Karl Popper (7) points out.
The old scientific ideal of episteme — of absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge — has proved to be an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever. It may indeed be corroborated, but every corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are tentative. Only in our subjective experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be 'absolutely certain' (p. 280).
Science never pursues the illusory aim of making its answers final, or even probable (p. 281).
On the other hand, Popper himself has helped science regain some
confidence by suggesting a new approach to scientific investigation that has gained a
significant degree of acceptance. He proposes that science should not establish truth by
induction or confirmation of consequences or the refutation of rival concepts, but by the
more severe empirical (sense experience) tests of trying to falsify the hypothesis itself,
and a hypothesis should be empirically falsifiable to be considered scientific. Often it
is not recognized in scientific endeavors that this concept tends to narrow science to a
rather limited segment of reality.
Another blow to the objectivity of science has come from the pen of
historian-philosopher Thomas Kuhn who in his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (8) pointed out that normal science is the refining of broadly accepted
concepts called paradigms. Examples would be alchemy, uniformitarianism, or evolution.
Most scientific data are fitted into a paradigm by varying modes of explanation. The
paradigm itself is not tested, since it is believed to be true. Occasionally science has a
change in paradigm, and this is called a scientific revolution. During a period of normal
science a scientist must fit his data into the accepted paradigm or become discredited by
the scientific community. Kuhn did not endear himself to scientists when he described the
transfer from one paradigm to another as being a "conversion experience" (p.
151), and he emphasized that a new paradigm may not be closer to truth than the rejected
one. He states: "We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit
or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them
closer and closer to the truth" (p. 170).
Kuhn's concept, first published in 1962, raised many questions and
engendered a kind of revolution itself. Up to that time philosophy in general had been
dominated by the philosophy of science. This prime role has been declining, and the
philosophy of science has been labelled as being in a "crisis stage" due to a
loss of confidence in objectivity and also to the collapse of logical empiricism, which
has been labelled as "dead" (9).
Science is now being perceived more as a human activity, and the
contrast between so-called objective truth and metaphysics is considered a "relic of
a bygone philosophy of science" (10). For instance, the question is now being raised
as to why cosmology should not be reinstated to its former status as the combined realm of
science, philosophy and religion. Science is now perceived more as an activity with
sociological dimensions. The focus is more on the factors that determine the origin and
formulation of scientific questions than on the answers to these questions; and complex,
holistic (broad-approach) methods are replacing reductionistic (simplifying) ones. The
scientific philosopher Ronald Giere (11) has made a radical proposal that would have
struck the pre-Kuhnian logical empiricists as "bizarre if not absurd" (12). He
suggests that the philosophy of science itself, which once held a super-eminent place,
should be subject to testing by evidence as is required of any other model. He especially
emphasizes historical data as significant in evaluation.
The loss of confidence in science is, of course, of major concern to
some scientists; unfortunately, many are unaware of the changes occurring in their
philosophy. Nevertheless, the primacy science once held in intellectual pursuits is being
severely challenged. Two British scientists in expressing their concern state:
"Having lost their monopoly in the production of knowledge, scientists have also lost
their privileged status in society" (13). These authors bemoan the resultant loss of
funding for science and the ascent of competing concepts such as creation. They are
concerned that by releasing a monopoly on truth, science may be reduced to a pointless
game.
No one knows where the philosophy of science is going next. In the last
few years it has moved well beyond Kuhn's original sociological suggestions. It appears to
be going in diverse directions (14). There are those philosophers who are only presenting
old wine in new bottles, while others have made a complete reversal from empirical
(verification by sense experience) concepts to more subjective bases. These are
interesting intellectual times.
In summary, we can note that the philosophy of science has abandoned
the view that science can give us perfect knowledge. Other factors (sociological,
psychological, etc.) are considered to be important determiners of scientific questions
and the resultant answers. This has resulted in a notable anti-scientific reaction. While
scientism (science as a kind of religion) is still very alive in limited circles, science
no longer commands the high respect it had during the first two-thirds of this century.
On the basis of the above there are those who would tend to reject all
scientific information as simplistic, biased, and restricted. Such views seem unwarranted.
While the adjustment that the philosophy of science has had to take in recent decades is
salutary, we must not forget that science is a marvelous enterprise which no one can deny
has an impressive record of successes, especially in the naturalistic realm. The
limitations and problems inherent to science and its philosophy should not be used as
excuses to deny the value of science in its proper sphere. On the other hand, the
simplistic worship of science seems to be likewise unwarranted. In too many instances
science has gone wrong in trying to explain everything within its own limited system.
Science is a great good in bringing us an abundance of new information, but to blindly
follow it and follow it alone is not only bad; it is very bad.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
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Geoscience Research Institute. All rights reserved.
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