Origins 4(2):64-67 (1977).
Re: Kootsey: Can the Christian afford scientific research? (ORIGINS 3:97-100).
I very much enjoyed the article by Mailen Kootsey. He says some
things which have needed to be said in the conservative Christian community for a long
time. I hope that the leadership of this community will recognize the validity of his
viewpoint and seek to assist Christian scholars in a more active research program in a
variety of areas.
Personally, I feel there is another important reason why the Christian must
afford scientific research. In educational programs for the next generation of young
Christians in theology, the arts and sciences and the derived professions, Christian
teachers must use the knowledge produced by the efforts of other scholars both Christian
and non-Christian. Surely we have an obligation, even a moral obligation, to contribute to
this body of knowledge by sound research and scholarship. Otherwise we are parasites
drawing on resources to which we have made no contribution.
Granted that our priorities may be different from those of secular
society, I am still forced to the conclusion that Christians must conduct scientific and
other scholarly research and that Christian educational institutions and their supporting
organizations must allocate a significant share of their resources to such activity.
Obviously, there will be an emphasis on certain areas and aspects in such a research
effort although no area should be automatically excluded. We might be surprised by the
impact of such activity as a form of Christian witness to members of the intellectual
community, other leaders in thought and ultimately the world at large.
Ian M. Fraser
Chairman, Department of Physiology and Pharmacology
Loma Linda University, Loma Linda, California
Re: Stidd: Reactions (ORIGINS 4:12-15).
Dr. Stidd has summarized one way of interpreting homologies, but
there is another equally valid way of looking at them.
One of his main objections is that if the major groups of animals were
created, there should be differences between natural homologies (arising through natural
selection) and supernatural homologies (similarities designed and created by God), and
thus we should be able to identify which homologous features were created and which ones
have developed through natural processes.
Since an animal's characteristics are controlled by its genes, a
certain set of genes will produce a certain type of animal, irrespective of how those
genes were selected — selective breeding by a geneticist, natural selection, or
deliberate choice by a Designer. Consequently if we are going to find detectable
differences between supernatural homologies and natural or evolved homologies, we would
need to predict that the complement of genes chosen for each original animal by the
Creator would be different, in some very fundamental way, from the complements of genes
that would be subsequently favored by natural selection. But if the Creator who made the
original animal kinds with their individual genetic makeup was the same Creator who
designed the genetic mechanism that would allow them to diverge into new species and adapt
to changing conditions, we would expect to find a unity throughout the genetic systems of
all living things. If that is the case, why would there be any basic differences between
"natural homologies" and "supernatural homologies"? In the process of
adaptation to a new environment we would expect natural selection to favor the combination
of genes that will produce the best adapted animal for that environment. If the Creator
had originally designed the animal for that lifestyle in that environment, would we expect
Him to have chosen a less suitable set of genes? If an intelligent, logical thinking God
who knows everything about biological systems designed animal genetic systems with the
potential to adapt to new circumstances that may arise, and also used that same genetic
code to design the first animals to be well adapted to their first environment, I see no
basic reason for believing that there would be detectable differences between
"supernatural homologies" and "natural homologies."
One possible exception to the above conclusion is that perhaps there
would be essentially quantitative differences in the genetic gap between created types as
compared to subsequently developed variations within created types. For example the
differences between fish and mammals (which the creationist will consider to be different
created groups) are far greater than the differences between two similar species of Peromyscus,
or white-footed mice (probably new species that developed within a created kind). At
intermediate taxonomic levels — orders, families, and genera — we would expect
to find differences that are intermediate in magnitude. The result is somewhat of a
continuum, with the smallest degree of taxonomic divergence at the subspecies level and
the greatest divergence at the kingdom level. One could then ask whether there is one
taxonomic level (the genus level, e.g.) that shows, on the average, a
greater-than-expected amount of change in taxonomic divergences. For instance, if
extensive study demonstrated that the differences between genera are generally more
distinct and consistent than might be expected, then one could theorize that the genus
was, on the average, the limit of the created kind. However, there also might be
other equally logical explanations for that data. And if there is no unexpected jump in
taxonomic divergence at any taxonomic level, there may be several reasonable theories to
explain that, including the possibility that the amount of genetic difference between
created kinds was sufficiently small and variable to make it very difficult for us to
determine what the created kinds were. If one assumes that all organisms evolved, then
homologies may be useful to indicate the most likely evolutionary pathways; and if one
assumes creation, then homologies may or may not provide information that can help to
indicate the most likely limits of the created kinds. However, if we ask the more
fundamental question, "Is macroevolution true, or is creation true?" —
homologies are no help, because they can be logically explained by either view.
The letter suggests that "if the creationist paleontologist finds
that he cannot distinguish between natural and supernatural homologies and natural and
supernatural taxa, perhaps this suggests that he should examine his basic premises."
Then he lists the following possible sources of error:
To be complete, the list needs at least one more alternative:
Criticism is made of the analogy between the "evolutionary
trees" for animals and wheeled vehicles, and the conclusion is drawn that "the
contention that the same principles of comparison are applicable to vehicles and organisms
is like comparing apples with bolts; apples can produce apples — more bolts can be
produced only by man. Only if one has evidence that man can produce apples is the logic
satisfied." These comments illustrate the well-known concept that all analogies break
down if they are carried too far and applied in ways that were not intended.
Since none of us has lived all through earth history to observe
directly what biological changes have occurred since the beginning, we only have access to
indirect, circumstantial evidence. We can only look at homologies and other types of
indirect evidence in living and fossil animals and use that data to hypothesize how much
change has occurred and which animals descended from which others. However, there is
generally more than one reasonable explanation for indirect evidence like that. My analogy
between evolutionary trees for animals and for vehicles illustrates only one point —
namely, that because animals can be arranged in a sequence from simple to complex, based
on homologies, is not in itself evidence that they evolved from a common, simple
ancestor. Additional, more direct, evidence would be needed to answer that question. If
the analogy is applied in other ways, naturally it falls apart.
If one assumes evolution from simple to complex, homologies
can be useful in tracing the most likely lines of descent. If one is trying to determine
whether evolution or creation is more likely to be correct, homologies do not help in
making that decision.
The letter raises another important issue, and that is concerning the
nature of evidence, especially as it relates to studies of historical processes such as
evolution. The letter's reconstruction of a possible dispute between a creationist and an
evolutionist indicates that the latter "believes he can account for observed
differences and similarities on a natural basis and sees no compelling reasons why
supernatural agencies need be invoked." However, the fact that he doesn't see reasons
for invoking supernatural agencies is quite irrelevant to the fundamental issues in the
dispute, for he also cannot produce compelling evidence against the possibility
of supernatural involvement.
The letter points out that a problem with a creationist view is that it
cannot be refuted or proven false by any data. In other words it cannot be scientifically
tested; "it rests on an assumption not amenable to empirical analysis." A
balanced discussion of this issue must also recognize that large areas of the evolution
theory also rest on assumptions not amenable to empirical analysis and cannot be
scientifically tested. Creationists are not the only ones who recognize that problem. For
instance N.I. Platnick (1977. Review of Evolution and the diversity of life. Systematic
Zoology 26:224-228), an evolutionist, states that "both kinds of explanations
[creation and natural selection] fall into the category of those 'that could neither be
proven nor refuted'." L.C.Birch and P.R. Ehrlich (1967. Evolutionary history and
population biology. Nature 214:349-352), also evolutionists, discuss the problem of the
non-testability of evolutionary hypotheses and how it affects their research fields. They
state that to "attempt to investigate ecology and taxonomy through a series of
inferences about the past is to base these sciences on non-falsifiable hypotheses."
This problem of the non-testability of theories about the past also applies in other
fields besides ecology.
The letter indicates that an evolutionist will reject supernatural
agencies because "he believes that he can account for observed differences and
similarities on a natural basis and sees no compelling reasons why supernatural agencies
need be invoked." On the other hand Platnick (op.cit.) concludes that this kind of
reliance on logical, "good enough" explanations even though they "are (at
least practically) untestable ¼ makes of evolutionary
biologists spinners of tales, bedtime storytellers, instead of empirical
investigators."
The view is presented in the letter that "if there is no
difference [between natural and supernatural homologies], the creationist interpretation
appears to be an ad hoc argument designed to harmonize science and Scripture."
However, one can also propose that the hypothesized ability of natural selection to
produce unlimited change and increased complexity is an ad hoc argument designed to
eliminate the Designer from the system. Which explanation a person chooses is largely the
result of his philosophy and his preconceptions. Only when we all (creationists and
evolutionists) recognize how much our conclusions are affected by our preconceptions and
our philosophical choices and recognize the nature of the assumptions that we make
(consciously or unconsciously) will we be able to fruitfully discuss the fundamental
issues.
Leonard R. Brand
Chairman, Department of Biology
Loma Linda University, Loma Linda, California
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Geoscience Research Institute. All rights reserved.
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